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Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 57 No. 7 2022

Blockholder Disclosure Thresholds and Hedge Fund Activism

Guillem Ordóñez-Calafí; Dan Bernhardt1

1 University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

open access

Abstract

Blockholder disclosure thresholds shape incentives for hedge fund activism, which are jointly determined with real investment and managerial behavior. Uninformed investors value lower thresholds (greater transparency) when the cost of trading against an informed activist outweighs the benefits of the activist’s disciplining of management. Conversely, activists may desire disclosure thresholds if the threat of their participation discourages managerial malfeasance, which is their source of profits. Hedge fund activism can be excessive: If market opacity sufficiently harms uninformed investors, the costs of reduced real investment outweigh the social benefits from managerial disciplining, and society benefits from lower thresholds.

DOI
10.1017/s0022109022000059
Volume
57
Issue
7
Pages
2834-2859
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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