The Effect of Incentives in Nonroutine Analytical Team Tasks

Florian Englmaier; Stefan Grimm; Dominik Grothe; David Schindler; Simeon Schudy

doi:10.1086/729443

Journal of Political Economy Vol. 132 No. 8 2024

The Effect of Incentives in Nonroutine Analytical Team Tasks

Florian Englmaier^1,2,3,4,5; Stefan Grimm^1,2,3,4,5; Dominik Grothe^1,2,3,4,5; David Schindler^1,2,3,4,5; Simeon Schudy^1,2,3,4,5

¹ Augsburg University · ² Ifo Institute for Economic Research · ³ Tilburg University · ⁴ Seoul School of Integrated Sciences and Technologies · ⁵ Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

Abstract

Despite the prevalence of nonroutine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is understood regarding how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a series of field experiments involving more than 5,000 participants, we investigate how incentives alter behavior in teams working on such a task. We document a positive effect of bonus incentives on performance, even among teams with strong intrinsic motivation. Bonuses also transform team organization by enhancing the demand for leadership. Exogenously increasing teams' demand for leadership results in performance improvements comparable to those seen with bonus incentives, rendering it as a likely mediator of incentive effects.

DOI: 10.1086/729443
Volume: 132
Issue: 8
Pages: 2695-2747
Language: en
Sources: bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

The Effect of Incentives in Nonroutine Analytical Team Tasks

Abstract

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