← Search

Journal of Political Economy Vol. 107 No. 4 1999

Defense Procurement Fraud, Penalties, and Contractor Influence

Jonathan M. Karpoff1; Dongwoo Lee2; Valaria P. Vendrzyk3

1 University of Washington · 2 Mitchell Institute · 3 Virginia Tech

Abstract

Press reports of investigations of fraud, indictments, and suspensions in military procurement are associated with significantly negative average abnormal returns in the stocks of affected firms. Abnormal stock returns are significantly less negative, however, for firms ranking among the top 100 defense contractors than for unranked contractors, even after one controls for firm size, the frauds' characteristics, and the firm's recidivism. Unranked contractors are penalized heavily for procurment frauds, experiencing both a decline in market value and a subsequent loss in government‐derived revenues. Furthermore, these losses are related to the percentage of the firm's revenues that derive from government contracts. Influential contractors, in contrast, are penalized lightly, experiencing negligible changes in share value and government contract revenue.

DOI
10.1086/250080
Volume
107
Issue
4
Pages
809-842
Language
en
Sources
openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib

Cite