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Journal of Political Economy Vol. 108 No. 1 2000

Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections

Eddie Dekel1; Michele Piccione2

1 Tel Aviv University · 2 London School of Economics and Political Science

Abstract

We explore sequential voting in symmetric two‐option environments. We show that the (informative) symmetric equilibria of the simultancous voting game are also equilibria in any sequential voting structure. In unanimity games, (essentially) the whole set of equilibria is the same in all sequential structures. We also explore the relationship between simultaneous and sequential voting in other contexts. We illustrate several instances in which sequential voting does no better at aggregating information than simultaneous voting. The inability of the sequential structure to use additional information in voting models is distinct from that in the herd‐cascade literature.

DOI
10.1086/262110
Volume
108
Issue
1
Pages
34-55
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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