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Journal of Political Economy Vol. 107 No. 4 1999

Early Starters versus Late Beginners

Pierre-André Chiappori1; Bernard Salanié; Julie Valentin2

1 University of Chicago · 2 Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

Abstract

We consider a model of wage formation characterized by two features, learning and downward rigidity. We show that wages should exhibit a late‐beginning property: when one controls for the wage at date t, the wage at date t + 1 should be negatively correlated with the wage at date 6–1. We test this property on a sample of about 1,000 executives of a French state‐owned firm whose careers we observe for 15 years. This organization exhibits the features that charecterize internal labor markets; in particular, careers consist of sequences of discrete promotions, a fact that generates specific econometric problems. The results confirm the prediction.

DOI
10.1086/250077
Volume
107
Issue
4
Pages
731-760
Language
en
Sources
openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib

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