Journal of Political Economy Vol. 107 No. 4 1999
Early Starters versus Late Beginners
Abstract
We consider a model of wage formation characterized by two features, learning and downward rigidity. We show that wages should exhibit a late‐beginning property: when one controls for the wage at date t, the wage at date t + 1 should be negatively correlated with the wage at date 6–1. We test this property on a sample of about 1,000 executives of a French state‐owned firm whose careers we observe for 15 years. This organization exhibits the features that charecterize internal labor markets; in particular, careers consist of sequences of discrete promotions, a fact that generates specific econometric problems. The results confirm the prediction.
- DOI
- 10.1086/250077
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 731-760
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib