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Journal of Political Economy Vol. 133 No. 7 2025

Asymmetric Information Sharing in Oligopoly: A Natural Experiment in Retail Gasoline

David Byrne1; Nicolas de Roos; Matthew S. Lewis2; Leslie M. Marx3; Xiaosong Wu1

1 The University of Melbourne · 2 Clemson University · 3 Duke University

Abstract

Using a natural experiment from a retail gasoline antitrust case, we study how asymmetric information sharing affects oligopoly pricing. Empirically, price competition softens when, following case settlement, information sharing shifts from symmetric to asymmetric, with one firm losing access to high-frequency granular rival price data. We provide theory and empirics illustrating how strategic ignorance creates price commitment, leading to higher price-cost margins. Using a structural model, we find substantial profit-enhancing effects of asymmetric information sharing. These results provide a cautionary tale for antitrust agencies regarding the potential unintended consequences of limiting price information sharing among firms.

DOI
10.1086/734872
Volume
133
Issue
7
Pages
2031-2088
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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