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Journal of Political Economy Vol. 132 No. 11 2024

The Network Origins of Entry

Arthur Campbell1,2,3,4; Philip Ushchev1,2,3,4; Yves Zenou

1 Economic Policy Institute · 2 Australian Regenerative Medicine Institute · 3 Centre for Economic Policy Research · 4 Monash University

open access

Abstract

We develop a model of market entry under social learning through word of mouth (WOM). The success of an entrant depends on consumer awareness generated via WOM, modeled as a percolation process on a random graph. The likelihood of an entrant gaining significant awareness depends on network structure, characterized by the first three factorial moments of the degree distribution. We identify three pricing equilibria: blockaded, deterred, and accommodated entry. The model demonstrates that increased network density can shift equilibria from blockaded to deterred and eventually to accommodated entry. Numerical simulations suggest that consumer surplus may be nonmonotonic with respect to network density. Additionally, if incumbents can charge personalized prices based on consumers' connectivity, they may optimally set lower prices for highly connected consumers.

DOI
10.1086/730550
Volume
132
Issue
11
Pages
3867-3916
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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