Journal of Political Economy Vol. 107 No. 4 1999
When is the Standard Analysis of Common Property Extraction under Free Access Correct? A Game‐Theoretic justification for Non‐Game‐Theoretic Analyses
Abstract
Analyses of common property extraction under free access follow two distinct paths, traditional and game‐theoretic, giving rise to two standard methodologies. One methodology avoids game‐theoretic analysis by assuming that aggregate extraction in each period induces fel rent dissipation. The second methodology solves for the Marko‐perfect equilibrium of an n‐player extraction game investigating aggregate behavior over time as n → ∞. We show by example that these coexisting standard methodologies can yield conflicting predictions. We then provide conditions, relatively easy to satisfy, sufficient for the two approaches to yield the same predictions.
- DOI
- 10.1086/250081
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 843-858
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib