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Journal of Political Economy Vol. 129 No. 11 2021

Optimal Income Taxation: Mirrlees Meets Ramsey

Jonathan Heathcote1; Hitoshi Tsujiyama2

1 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis · 2 Goethe University Frankfurt

Abstract

We explore the optimal shape of the income tax and transfer schedule in an environment with distinct roles for public and private insurance. In a calibration to the United States, we find that the optimal system features marginal tax rates that increase in income. When we increase pressure on the government to raise revenue, the optimal marginal tax schedule becomes first flatter and then U-shaped, reconciling various findings in the literature. A power function parametric tax schedule outperforms an affine one, indicating that tax progressivity is more important than lump-sum transfers. We also explore various social welfare objectives and Pareto-improving reforms.

DOI
10.1086/715851
Volume
129
Issue
11
Pages
3141-3184
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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