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Journal of Political Economy Vol. 126 No. 4 2018

Unobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games

Jeremy T. Fox1,2; Chenyu Yang3; David H. Hsu4

1 National Bureau of Economic Research · 2 Rice University · 3 University of Rochester · 4 California University of Pennsylvania

Abstract

Agents in two-sided matching games vary in characteristics that are unobservable in typical data on matching markets. We investigate the identification of the distribution of unobserved characteristics using data on who matches with whom. In full generality, we consider many-to-many matching and matching with trades. The distribution of match-specific unobservables cannot be fully recovered without information on unmatched agents, but the distribution of a combination of unobservables, which we call unobserved complementarities, can be identified. Using data on unmatched agents restores identification.

DOI
10.1086/697740
Volume
126
Issue
4
Pages
1339-1373
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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