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Journal of Political Economy Vol. 129 No. 5 2021

How to Improve Tax Compliance? Evidence from Population-Wide Experiments in Belgium

Jan-Emmanuel De Neve; Clément Imbert1; Johannes Spinnewijn2; Teodora Tsankova3; Maarten Luts4

1 University of Warwick · 2 London School of Economics and Political Science · 3 Tilburg University · 4 Service Public Federal Finances

open access

Abstract

We study the impact of simplification, deterrence, and tax morale on tax compliance. We ran four natural field experiments varying the communication of the tax administration with the universe of income taxpayers in Belgium throughout the tax process. A consistent picture emerges across experiments: (i) simplifying communication substantially increases compliance, (ii) deterrence messages have an additional positive effect, (iii) invoking tax morale is not effective and often backfires. A discontinuity in enforcement intensity, combined with the experimental variation, allows us to compare simplification with standard enforcement measures. We find that simplification is far more cost-effective, allowing for substantial savings on enforcement costs.

DOI
10.1086/713096
Volume
129
Issue
5
Pages
1425-1463
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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