Journal of Political Economy Vol. 120 No. 6 2012
A Model of Persuasion with Boundedly Rational Agents
open access
Abstract
A new model of persuasion is presented. A listener first announces and commits to a codex (i.e., a set of conditions). The speaker then presents a (not necessarily true) profile that must satisfy the codex in order for the listener to be persuaded. The speaker is boundedly rational in the sense that his ability to come up with a persuasive profile is limited and depends on the true profile and the content and framing of the codex. The circumstances under which the listener can design a codex that will implement his goal are fully characterized.
- DOI
- 10.1086/669160
- Volume
- 120
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1057-1082
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref