Journal of Political Economy Vol. 111 No. 3 2003
Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Intergenerational Games: An Experimental Study
Abstract
We investigate the creation and evolution of conventions of behavior in “intergenerational games” or games in which a sequence of nonoverlapping “generations” of players play a stage game for a finite number of periods and are then replaced by other agents who continue the game in their role for an identical length of time. Players in generation t can offer advice to their successors in generation t+1. What we find is that word‐of‐mouth social learning (in the form of advice from laboratory “parents” to laboratory “children”) can be a strong force in the creation of social conventions.
- DOI
- 10.1086/374187
- Volume
- 111
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 498-529
- Language
- en
- Sources
- crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex