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Journal of Political Economy Vol. 125 No. 6 2017

Financial Constraints and Moral Hazard: The Case of Franchising

Ying Fan1; Kai-Uwe Kühn2,3,4; Francine Lafontaine3

1 National Bureau of Economic Research · 2 University of East Anglia · 3 Economic Policy Institute · 4 Centre for Economic Policy Research

open access

Abstract

Financial constraints are considered an important impediment to growth for small businesses. We study theoretically and empirically the relationship between the financial constraints of agents and the organizational decisions and growth of principals, in the context of franchising. We find that a 30 percent decrease in average collateralizable housing wealth in an area is associated with a delay in chains’ entry into franchising by 0.33 year on average, or 10 percent of the average waiting time, and a reduction in chain growth and hence a reduction in franchised chain employment of about 9 percent.

DOI
10.1086/694566
Volume
125
Issue
6
Pages
2082-2125
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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