Journal of Political Economy Vol. 123 No. 5 2015
Political Economy in a Changing World
Abstract
We provide a general framework for the analysis of institutional dynamics in an environment in which payoffs and political powers change stochastically. Assuming that economic and political institutions as well as individual types can be ordered, and preferences and the distribution of political power satisfy natural “single-crossing” (increasing differences) conditions, we prove existence of a pure-strategy Markov voting equilibrium, provide conditions for its uniqueness, and present a number of comparative static results. We then use this framework to study the dynamics of political rights and repression in the presence of threats from extremist groups and the dynamics of collective experimentation.
- DOI
- 10.1086/682679
- Volume
- 123
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1038-1086
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref