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Journal of Political Economy Vol. 131 No. 10 2023

Multidimensional Premarital Investments with Imperfect Commitment

V. Bhaskar1; Wenchao Li2; Junjian Yi3

1 The University of Texas at Austin · 2 Tongji University · 3 Peking University

Abstract

We analyze premarital investments in human capital and housing when individuals are unable to make binding commitments to share their labor income with a prospective spouse. Investments are distorted if there are gender differences in bargaining power over own labor income or marriage market imbalances. Distortions are magnified when ex ante bargaining power favors one sex (e.g., women in China) and ex post bargaining power favors the other (e.g., men in China), since parents of boys will increase housing investments in order to credibly commit to share more resources with the boy’s potential wife, possibly crowding out human capital investments.

DOI
10.1086/724574
Volume
131
Issue
10
Pages
2893-2919
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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