Journal of Political Economy Vol. 119 No. 2 2011
Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections
open access
Abstract
We study a model in which voters choose between two candidates on the basis of both ideology and competence. While the ideology of the candidates is commonly known, voters are imperfectly informed about competence. Voter preferences, however, are such that ideology alone determines voting. When voting is compulsory, the candidate of the majority ideology prevails, and this may not be optimal from a social perspective. However, when voting is voluntary and costly, we show that turnout adjusts endogenously so that the outcome of a large election is always first-best.
- DOI
- 10.1086/660731
- Volume
- 119
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 183-211
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref