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Journal of Political Economy Vol. 124 No. 6 2016

Why the Referential Treatment? Evidence from Field Experiments on Referrals

Amanda Pallais1,2,3; Emily Glassberg Sands3

1 National Bureau of Economic Research · 2 Harvard University · 3 Harvard University Press

Abstract

Referred workers are more likely than nonreferred workers to be hired, all else equal. In three field experiments in an online labor market, we examine why. We find that referrals contain positive information about worker performance and persistence that is not contained in workers’ observable characteristics. We also find that referrals perform particularly well when working directly with their referrers. However, we do not find evidence that referrals exert more effort because they believe their performance will affect their relationship with their referrer or their referrer’s position at the firm.

DOI
10.1086/688850
Volume
124
Issue
6
Pages
1793-1828
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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