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Journal of Political Economy Vol. 127 No. 1 2019

The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct

Mark Egan1; Gregor Matvos2; Amit Seru3

1 Harvard University Press · 2 The University of Texas at Austin · 3 Stanford University

Abstract

We document the economywide extent of misconduct among financial advisers and the associated labor market consequences. Seven percent of advisers have misconduct records, and this share reaches more than 15 percent at some of the largest firms. Roughly one-third of advisers with misconduct are repeat offenders. Approximately half of advisers lose their jobs after misconduct. The labor market partially undoes firm-level discipline by rehiring such advisers. Firms that persistently engage in misconduct coexist with firms that have clean records. We show that this phenomenon may be explained by some firms “specializing” in misconduct and catering to unsophisticated consumers.

DOI
10.1086/700735
Volume
127
Issue
1
Pages
233-295
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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