Journal of Political Economy Vol. 119 No. 2 2011

Factions and Political Competition

Nicola Persico^1,2; José C. R. Pueblita³; Dan Silverman¹

¹ National Bureau of Economic Research · ² New York University · ³ Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México

Abstract

This paper presents a new model of political competition in which candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party to the allocation of resources. In doing so, the model provides a unified explanation of two prominent features of public resource allocations: the persistence of (possibly inefficient) policies and the tendency of public spending to favor incumbent party strongholds over swing constituencies.

DOI

10.1086/660298

Volume

119

Issue

2

Pages

242-288

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite

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