Journal of Political Economy Vol. 107 No. 5 1999
Age Discrimination Laws and Labor Market Efficiency
Abstract
In Lazear's model of long‐term incentive contracts, age discrimina‐tion laws barring age‐ based involuntary terminations preclude such contracts, reducing efficiency. Alternatively, such laws may serve as precommitment devices for these contracts, without pre‐venting firms from offering strong financial incentives to induce retirement at specific ages. In this case, age discrimination laws may encourage Lazear contracts, hence increasing efficiency. We assess evidence on these alternative interpretations using variation in state and federal age discrimination laws. The evidence indicates that age discrimination laws steepen age‐earnings profiles for co‐horts entering the labor market, suggesting that these laws encour‐age the use of Lazear contracts.
- DOI
- 10.1086/250091
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1081-1125
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib