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Journal of Political Economy Vol. 115 No. 6 2007

Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets

Raymond Fisman1; Edward Miguel1,2

1 National Bureau of Economic Research · 2 University of California, Berkeley

Abstract

We study cultural norms and legal enforcement in controlling corruption by analyzing the parking behavior of United Nations officials in Manhattan. Until 2002, diplomatic immunity protected U.N. diplomats from parking enforcement actions, so diplomats ’ actions were constrained by cultural norms alone. We find a strong effect of corruption norms: diplomats from high corruption countries (based on existing survey-based indices) accumulated significantly more unpaid parking violations. In 2002, enforcement authorities acquired the right to confiscate diplomatic plates of violators. Unpaid violations dropped sharply in response. Corruption norms and (particularly in this context) legal enforcement are both important determinants of corruption.

DOI
10.1086/527495
Volume
115
Issue
6
Pages
1020-1048
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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