Journal of Political Economy Vol. 127 No. 1 2019

Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation: A Correction

Massimo Morelli^1,2,3; Margherita Negri⁴

¹ Institute for Economic Research · ² Centre for Economic Policy Research · ³ Bocconi University · ⁴ University of St Andrews

Abstract

Austen-Smith (2000) reports a theoretical result that if the cost of entering the workforce is sufficiently low, winner-take-all political systems induce endogenous redistribution levels that are systematically lower than those determined by proportional representation systems (Proposition 6). The proof in Austen-Smith (2000) has a mistake. We explain the mistake and offer an alternative proof. The conclusion of the original paper continues to hold.

DOI

10.1086/700733

Volume

127

Issue

1

Pages

458-462

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite

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