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Journal of Political Economy Vol. 108 No. 5 2000

Federal Mandates by Popular Demand

Jacques Crémer1,2,3; Thomas R. Palfrey4

1 Université Fédérale de Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées · 2 Institut d'Économie Industrielle · 3 Centre National pour la Recherche Scientifique et Technique (CNRST) · 4 California Institute of Technology

Abstract

This paper proposes a new framework for studying federal mandates regarding public policies in areas such as environmental quality, public health, highway safety, and the provision of local public goods. Voters have single‐peaked preferences along a single policy dimension. There are two levels of government, federal and local. The federal level can constrain local policy by mandating a minimum (or maximum) policy. Localities are free to adopt any policy satisfying the constraint imposed by the federal mandate. We show that voters choose federal mandates that are too strict, which leads to excessively severe mandates. We show that similar results can obtain when federal provision of the public‐provided good is more efficient than local provision.

DOI
10.1086/317669
Volume
108
Issue
5
Pages
905-927
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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