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Journal of Political Economy Vol. 121 No. 3 2013

Optimal Apportionment

Yukio Koriyama1; Jean-François Laslier1,2; Antonin Macé1; Rafael Treibich1

1 École Polytechnique · 2 Centre National pour la Recherche Scientifique et Technique (CNRST)

Abstract

This paper provides a theoretical foundation that supports the degressive proportionality principle in apportionment problems, such as the allocation of seats in a federal parliament. The utility assigned by an individual to a constitutional rule is a function of the frequency with which each collective decision matches the individual’s own will. The core of the argument is that, if the function is concave, then classical utilitarianism at the social level recommends decision rules that exhibit degressive proportionality with respect to the population size.

DOI
10.1086/670380
Volume
121
Issue
3
Pages
584-608
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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