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Journal of Political Economy Vol. 124 No. 5 2016

Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk

Juan Carlos Hatchondo1; Leonardo Martinez2; César Sosa-Padilla

1 Indiana University · 2 International Monetary Fund

Abstract

We measure the effects of debt dilution on sovereign default risk and study debt covenants that could mitigate these effects. We calibrate a baseline model with endogenous debt duration and default risk (in which debt can be diluted) using data from Spain. We find that debt dilution accounts for 78 percent of the default risk in the baseline economy and that eliminating dilution increases the optimal duration of sovereign debt by almost 2 years. Eliminating dilution also increases consumption volatility but still produces welfare gains. The debt covenants we study could help enforcing fiscal rules.

DOI
10.1086/688081
Volume
124
Issue
5
Pages
1383-1422
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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