Journal of Political Economy Vol. 128 No. 1 2020
On the Origins of the State: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo
Abstract
A positive demand shock for coltan, a mineral whose bulky output cannot be concealed, leads armed actors to create illicit customs and provide protection at coltan mines, where they settle as “stationary bandits.” A similar shock for gold, easy to conceal, leads to stationary bandits in the villages where income from gold is spent, where they introduce illicit mining visas, taxes, and administrations. Having a stationary bandit from a militia or the Congolese army increases welfare. These findings suggest that armed actors may create “essential functions of a state” to better expropriate, which, depending on their goals, can increase welfare.
- DOI
- 10.1086/703989
- Volume
- 128
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 32-74
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref