← Search

Journal of Political Economy Vol. 130 No. 1 2022

Rationing the Commons

Nicholas Ryan1; Anant Sudarshan2

1 Yale University · 2 University of Chicago

Abstract

Common resources may be managed with inefficient policies for the sake of equity. We study how rationing the commons shapes the efficiency and equity of resource use in the context of agricultural groundwater use in Rajasthan, India. We find that rationing binds on input use, such that farmers, despite trivial prices for water extraction, use roughly the socially optimal amount of water on average. The rationing regime is still grossly inefficient, because it misallocates water across farmers, lowering productivity. Pigouvian reform would increase agricultural surplus by 12% of household income yet fall well short of a Pareto improvement over rationing.

DOI
10.1086/717045
Volume
130
Issue
1
Pages
210-257
Language
en
Sources
openalex crossref bibtex:phds-export.bib

Cite