Get Rid of Unanimity Rule: The Superiority of Majority Rules with Veto Power

Laurent Bouton; Aniol Llorente-Saguer; Frédéric Malherbe

doi:10.1086/695477

Journal of Political Economy Vol. 126 No. 1 2018

Get Rid of Unanimity Rule: The Superiority of Majority Rules with Veto Power

Laurent Bouton^1,2,3; Aniol Llorente-Saguer^4,3; Frédéric Malherbe^3,5

¹ National Bureau of Economic Research · ² Georgetown University · ³ Centre for Economic Policy Research · ⁴ Queen Mary University of London · ⁵ London Business School

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Abstract

We study unanimous decision making under incomplete information. We argue that unanimous decision rules are not all equivalent. We show that majority rules with veto power are (i) Pareto superior to commonly used unanimous rules and (ii) ex ante efficient in a broad class of situations.

DOI: 10.1086/695477
Volume: 126
Issue: 1
Pages: 107-149
Language: en
Sources: bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Get Rid of Unanimity Rule: The Superiority of Majority Rules with Veto Power

Abstract

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