Bayesian Equilibria of Finite Two-Person Games with Incomplete Information

Joseph T. Howson; Robert W. Rosenthal

doi:10.1287/mnsc.21.3.313

Management Science Vol. 21 No. 3 1974

Bayesian Equilibria of Finite Two-Person Games with Incomplete Information

Joseph T. Howson¹; Robert W. Rosenthal²

¹ School of Management, Boston College · ² Department of Industrial Engineering and Management Sciences, Northwestern University

Abstract

The equivalence of Bayesian equilibria of two-person games with incomplete information and Nash equilibria of certain n-person polymatrix games is demonstrated by means of a specific “Selten model.” As a byproduct, constructions recently developed for polymatrix games are available for Bayesian equilibria.

DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.21.3.313
Volume: 21
Issue: 3
Pages: 313-315
Language: en
Sources: bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref openalex

Bayesian Equilibria of Finite Two-Person Games with Incomplete Information

Abstract

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