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Review of Finance Vol. 29 No. 3 2025

Revisiting board independence mandates: Evidence from director reclassifications

Donald E. Bowen1; Jérôme Taillard2

1 Department of Finance, College of Business, Lehigh University , Bethlehem PA 18015, · 2 Babson College , Babson Park MA 02457,

open access

Abstract

We provide causal evidence on the effects of mandated board independence. We compare firms that replace existing non-independent directors to firms that retain these directors by reclassifying them as independent. Reclassification eligibility, being largely predetermined, offers quasi-exogenous variation in compliance strategies. We show that firms required to replace insiders perform worse post-mandate, driven by increased operational costs and reduced labor efficiency. Boards of non-reclassifying firms retain fewer former employees and replace them with directors more likely to join monitoring-focused committees, emphasizing the shift from advising to monitoring. Overall, these findings suggest that firm-specific director expertise contributes materially to performance and is consistent with pre-mandate board compositions optimized to balance benefits of enhanced monitoring against costs of reduced advisory capacity. We rule out alternative explanations, including adjustment costs due to director turnover and co-option. Our study underscores the importance of allowing firms’ flexibility in governance structures and cautions against uniform mandates.

DOI
10.1093/rof/rfaf010
Volume
29
Issue
3
Pages
747-777
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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