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Review of Finance Vol. 28 No. 1 2024

Asymmetric Information and Corporate Lending: Evidence from SME Bond Markets

Alessandra Iannamorelli1; Stefano Nobili1; Antonio Scalia1; Luana Zaccaria2

1 Bank of Italy , Via Nazionale 91 , Rome 00184, · 2 Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance , Via Sallustiana 62 , Rome 00168,

open access

Abstract

Using a comprehensive dataset of Italian small and medium-sized enterprises, we find that differences between private and public information on firm creditworthiness affect the decision to issue bonds. Our evidence supports favorable (rather than adverse) selection in corporate bond markets. Specifically, holding public information constant, firms with better private fundamentals are more likely to access bond markets. These effects are weaker for opaque firms and stronger for firms with worse publicly observable risk. Additionally, credit conditions improve for issuers following the bond placement, compared with a matched sample of non-issuers. This is consistent with a model where banks offer more flexibility than markets during financial distress and firms use market lending to signal credit quality to outside stakeholders.

DOI
10.1093/rof/rfad024
Volume
28
Issue
1
Pages
163-201
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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