Review of Finance Vol. 26 No. 5 2022
Anticipating Disagreement in Dynamic Contracting
open access
Abstract
This paper studies how anticipated disagreement between a financier and an entrepreneur affects optimal contracting and asset prices. The value of debt is uniquely immune to anticipated disagreement, and when the set of anticipated disagreements is sufficiently rich, this immunity causes the optimal contract to give the financier debt. In contrast, the values of other contracts, including equity, decline as anticipated disagreement becomes more severe. This suggests a channel through which an increase in the severity of anticipated disagreement increases the equity premium and the debt-to-equity ratio.
- DOI
- 10.1093/rof/rfac007
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1241-1265
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref