Review of Finance Vol. 19 No. 5 2015

Trade Credit, Relationship-specific Investment, and Product Market Power

Nishant Dass¹; Jayant R. Kale²; Vikram K. Nanda³

¹ 1 Georgia Institute of Technology, · ² 2 Northeastern University, and · ³ 3 Rutgers University Business School

Abstract

We rely on a model with incomplete contracts and bargaining power to argue that trade credit (TC) can serve as a commitment device for making relationship-specific investments (RSIs). Unlike existing theories, we explain within a single theoretical framework why TC is affected by firms’ bargaining power and by the specialized nature of transacted goods. Using a large panel of publicly listed firms and innovation-based proxies for RSI, we find strong support for the model’s predictions: TC increases in upstream firm’s RSI and downstream firm’s market power. Endogeneity concerns are addressed by using the passage of innovation-increasing state laws to instrument for RSI and import penetration to instrument for bargaining power.

DOI

10.1093/rof/rfu038

Volume

19

Issue

5

Pages

1867-1923

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite

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