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Review of Finance Vol. 6 No. 3 2002

Market Discipline in the Governance of U.S. Bank Holding Companies: Monitoring vs. Influencing

Robert R. Bliss1; Mark J. Flannery2

1 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago · 2 University of Florida

open access

Abstract

Market discipline is an article of faith among financial economists, and the use of market discipline as a regulatory tool is gaining credibility. Effective market discipline involves two distinct components: security holders' ability to accurately assess the condition of a firm (monitoring) and their ability to cause subsequent managerial actions to reflect those assessments (influence). Substantial evidence supports the existence of market monitoring. However, the existing evidence about market influence involves relatively rare events such as management turnover. This paper seeks evidence that U.S. bank holding companies' security price changes reliably influence subsequent managerial actions. Although we identify some patterns consistent with beneficial market influences, our methodology does not provide strong evidence that stock or (especially) bond investors regularly influence managerial actions. Day-to-day market influence remains, for the moment, more a matter of faith than of empirical evidence.

DOI
10.1023/a:1022021430852
Volume
6
Issue
3
Pages
361-396
Language
en
Sources
openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

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