Review of Finance Vol. 3 No. 1 1999
The Market for Corporate Control and the Agency Paradigm
open access
Abstract
The paper analyzes the role of agency driven takeover activity. The analysis shows that takeovers can play an important role in reducing agency costs even though the gains from the corporate restructuring that follows the takeovers are zero, which counters existing models of agency driven takeover activity. The model can therefore form the basis for deriving empirical predictions which discriminate between the "agency paradigm" and the "corporate restructuring paradigm" of takeover activity. Negative post-merger performance
- DOI
- 10.1023/a:1009829729075
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-22
- Language
- en
- Sources
- bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref