The Accounting Review Vol. 99 No. 6 2024
CEO Incentives for Risk-Taking and Compensation Duration
Abstract
When determining new equity grants, corporate boards face a tradeoff between the CEO’s incentives generated from the grant’s duration versus those arising from the convexity of the embedded equity risk. We hypothesize and find that boards lengthen the horizon of new compensation grants in the presence of greater pre-existing compensation sensitivity to stock return volatility (vega). In addition, consistent with our hypothesis, we find stronger results in the presence of greater left-tail risk. Further, employing two exogenous shocks to left-tail risk, we provide evidence consistent with our hypothesis that grant horizons are related to risk incentives. Our analysis of the interaction of these two incentive mechanisms provides new insights on compensation contracting.
- DOI
- 10.2308/tar-2020-0784
- Volume
- 99
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 247-270
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref