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The Accounting Review Vol. 93 No. 2 2018

Strategic Disclosures of Litigation Loss Contingencies When Customer-Supplier Relationships Are at Risk

Ling Cen1; Feng Chen2; Yu Hou3; Gordon D. Richardson2

1 University of Toronto and The Chinese University of Hong Kong · 2 University of Toronto · 3 Queen's University

open access

Abstract

In the presence of litigation-facing suppliers, the supply chain relationship is at risk. Suppliers with principal customers (dependent suppliers) have a higher concentration of sales to customers, and they are more at risk relative to suppliers without principal customers (non-dependent suppliers). As a result, we predict and find that litigation disclosure patterns differ for the two supplier types: dependent suppliers are more likely to delay bad news and accelerate good news related to litigation outcomes, compared to non-dependent suppliers. Such strategic disclosure patterns in our end-game setting are opposite to those documented in the existing supply chain literature for the repeated-game setting (for example, Hui, Klasa, and Yeung 2012).

DOI
10.2308/accr-51869
Volume
93
Issue
2
Pages
137-159
Language
en
Sources
openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

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