The Accounting Review Vol. 98 No. 6 2023
Voluntary Performance Disclosures in the CD&A
Abstract
This paper examines voluntary disclosure in the context of shareholder scrutiny of executive compensation contracts. We find that firms voluntarily increase discussion of their performance within their CD&A disclosures when peer-benchmarked compensation relative to performance is high. In contrast, we do not find a similar increase in performance discussion in the corresponding MD&A disclosures, which suggests that the effect is not driven by firms’ general disclosure practices. We also find that the relation between relatively high compensation and CD&A performance disclosure strengthens following the implementation of mandatory Say-on-Pay, which increased costs associated with investor criticism of pay. These disclosures appear to be used effectively to avoid negative compensation assessments, in that they are associated with higher levels of shareholder and proxy advisor approval. Altogether, our findings suggest that CD&A performance disclosures allow firms to communicate the context of their compensation choices to improve shareholder opinions of pay. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.
- DOI
- 10.2308/tar-2021-0181
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 435-466
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref