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The Accounting Review Vol. 100 No. 1 2025

Disclosure and Dynamic Risk Sharing with a Large Shareholder

Davide Cianciaruso1; Lin Qiu2; Wenjie Xue3

1 New Economic School · 2 Purdue University · 3 Cornerstone Research

Abstract

We study the effects of disclosure in a dynamic market with imperfect competition. The supply of an asset is determined by a large shareholder with price impact, who trades slowly to diversify away from concentrated ownership. Small investors provide capital and thus risk-bearing capacity to the market. Although it is well known that disclosure impedes risk sharing by shifting risk before future trading opportunities, we show that disclosure, at the same time, can enhance risk sharing by promoting more trades. Resolving this tradeoff, an interior level of disclosure quality maximizes the small investors’ surplus as well as the total surplus, but minimizes the large shareholder’s surplus. Further, efficient disclosure policies feature increasing quality over time.

DOI
10.2308/tar-2022-0159
Volume
100
Issue
1
Pages
169-200
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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