Corporate Governance and Tax Avoidance: Evidence from U.S. Cross-Listing

Ruiyuan Chen; Sadok El Ghoul; Omrane Guedhami; He Wang; Yang Yang

doi:10.2308/tar-2019-0296

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The Accounting Review Vol. 97 No. 7 2022

Corporate Governance and Tax Avoidance: Evidence from U.S. Cross-Listing

Ruiyuan Chen¹; Sadok El Ghoul²; Omrane Guedhami³; He Wang¹; Yang Yang⁴

¹ West Virginia University · ² University of Alberta · ³ University of South Carolina · ⁴ Gannon University

Abstract

Using a sample of firms from 51 countries and a difference-in-differences approach that exploits corporate governance shocks induced by cross-listing in the U.S., we find that firms tend to engage in less tax avoidance after cross-listing. This effect is more pronounced for firms that experience significant improvements in corporate governance, and for firms from countries with weaker shareholder protection and disclosure requirements. Taken together, the results indicate that cross-listing in the U.S. helps align the interests of managers and shareholders and reduces managerial diversion. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources indicated in the text.

DOI: 10.2308/tar-2019-0296
Volume: 97
Issue: 7
Pages: 49-78
Language: en
Sources: openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

Corporate Governance and Tax Avoidance: Evidence from U.S. Cross-Listing

Abstract

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