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The Accounting Review Vol. 96 No. 5 2021

Disclosure Regulation and Competitive Interactions: Evidence from the Oil and Gas Industry

Marc Badia1; Miguel Duro1; Bjorn Jorgensen2,3; Gaizka Ormazabal1,4,5

1 IESE Business School · 2 Copenhagen Business School · 3 Hanken School of Economics · 4 Center for Economic Policy Research · 5 European Corporate Governance Institute

open access

Abstract

We study the effects of mandatory disclosure on competitive interactions in the setting of oil and gas (O&G) reserve disclosures by North American public firms. We document that reserve disclosures inform competitors: when one firm announces larger increases in O&G reserves, competitors experience lower announcement returns and higher real investments. To sharpen identification, we analyze several sources of cross-sectional variation in these patterns, the degree of competition, and the sign and the source of reserves changes. We also exploit two plausibly exogenous shocks: the tightening of the O&G reserve disclosure rules and the introduction of fracking technology. Additional tests more directly focused on the presence of proprietary costs confirm that the mandated reserve disclosures result in a relative loss of competitive edge for announcing firms. Our collective evidence highlights important trade-offs in the market-wide effects of disclosure regulation.

DOI
10.2308/tar-2018-0436
Volume
96
Issue
5
Pages
1-29
Language
en
Sources
openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

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