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The Accounting Review Vol. 81 No. 3 2006

Optimal Information Asymmetry

Madhav V. Rajan; Richard E. Saouma

Stanford University

Abstract

At the heart of decentralization lies the notion that tasks are delegated by owners to managers who possess superior local information. The extent of this information asymmetry is often an endogenous construct, as it is influenced by the owner's choice of internal accounting systems and the manager's investment in acquiring local expertise. In this paper, we explore how varying levels of pre-contract, asymmetric information affect the owner-manager relationship. We provide three main sets of insights. First, we find that the owner's payoffs are initially decreasing, and strictly convex everywhere, in the quality of the manager's private information. The owner thus prefers to deal with either a perfectly informed or a perfectly uninformed manager, and we characterize conditions for either to be the preferred choice. Second, in contrast to recent work, we demonstrate that when information can be communicated internally, the optimal strength of managerial incentives unambiguously decreases as the manager becomes better informed. Third, we derive the surprising result that a self-interested manager does not always prefer to maximize his informational advantage. Our work has implications for the optimal design of organizations, and for internal accounting and control systems in particular.

DOI
10.2308/accr.2006.81.3.677
Volume
81
Issue
3
Pages
677-712
Language
en
Sources
openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

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