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The Accounting Review Vol. 83 No. 4 2008

Asset Revaluation Regulation with Multiple Information Sources

Joel S. Demski; Haijin Lin; David E. M. Sappington

University of Florida

Abstract

We examine the design of asset revaluation policies in settings where a regulator can mandate fair value disclosure in order to mitigate a lemons problem in the asset resale market. The welfare-maximizing policy generally prescribes fair value certification for the lower asset values and (less costly) historical cost reporting for the higher asset values. The potential for voluntary certification can reduce welfare by increasing equilibrium certification costs and promoting underinvestment in socially valuable projects. Thus, a single regulated source of information (mandated disclosure) can be preferable to two sources of information (mandated and voluntary disclosure).

DOI
10.2308/accr.2008.83.4.869
Volume
83
Issue
4
Pages
869-891
Language
en
Sources
openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

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