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The Accounting Review Vol. 97 No. 5 2022

Do Firms Redact Information from Material Contracts to Conceal Bad News?

Dichu Bao1; Yongtae Kim2,3; Lixin Su4

1 Lingnan University · 2 Santa Clara University · 3 Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology · 4 The Hong Kong Polytechnic University

open access

Abstract

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) allows firms to redact information from material contracts by submitting confidential treatment requests if redacted information is not material and would cause competitive harm upon public disclosure. This study examines whether managers use confidential treatment requests to conceal bad news. We show that confidential treatment requests are positively associated with residual short interest, a proxy for managers' private negative information. This positive association is more pronounced for firms with lower litigation risk, higher executive equity incentives, and lower external monitoring. Confidential treatment requests filed by firms with higher residual short interests are associated with higher stock price crash risk and poorer future performance. Collectively, our results suggest that managers redact information from material contracts to conceal bad news. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the study.

DOI
10.2308/tar-2020-0255
Volume
97
Issue
5
Pages
29-57
Language
en
Sources
openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

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