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The Accounting Review Vol. 90 No. 6 2015

Do Clients Avoid “Contaminated” Offices? The Economic Consequences of Low-Quality Audits

Quinn Thomas Swanquist1; Robert Lowell Whited2

1 Georgia State University · 2 University of Massachusetts Amherst

Abstract

This study investigates whether the market for audit clients penalizes auditors following association with low-quality audits. Specifically, we examine whether audit offices experience a loss in local market share following client restatements. We document that the frequency of restatement announcements within an office-year (“contamination”) is inversely related to subsequent year-over-year change in local market share. Further analysis indicates that restatements impair the office's ability to both attract and retain audit clients. We find that this effect is strongest in high competition markets and diminished in low competition markets. We also examine auditor retention decisions at the client level and find that the likelihood of auditor dismissal increases with contamination, even for non-restating clients. We also find that, on average, clients dismissing their auditor select less contaminated audit offices. Taken together, our results suggest that market forces penalize auditors for association with audit failures, thereby providing an incentive to maintain high-quality audits and protect reputational capital.

DOI
10.2308/accr-51113
Volume
90
Issue
6
Pages
2537-2570
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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