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American Economic Review Vol. 114 No. 3 2024

Hub-and-Spoke Cartels: Theory and Evidence from the Grocery Industry

Robert Clark1; Ig Horstmann2; Jean-François Houde3

1 Queen’s University (email: ) · 2 Rotman School of Management (email: ) · 3 University of Wisconsin-Madison and NBER (email: )

Abstract

Numerous recently uncovered cartels operated along the supply chain, with firms at one end facilitating collusion at the other—hub-and-spoke arrangements. These cartels are hard to rationalize because they induce double marginalization and higher costs. We examine Canada’s alleged bread cartel and provide the first comprehensive analysis of hub-and-spoke collusion. Using court documents and pricing data, we make three contributions: (i) we show that collusion was effective, increasing inflation by about 50 percent; (ii) we provide evidence that collusion existed at both ends of the supply chain; and (iii) we develop a model explaining why this form of collusion arose.

DOI
10.1257/aer.20211337
Volume
114
Issue
3
Pages
783-814
Language
en
Sources
bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

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