American Economic Review Vol. 112 No. 2 2022

Taxes and Turnout: When the Decisive Voter Stays at Home

Felix Bierbrauer¹; Aleh Tsyvinski²; Nicolas Werquin³

¹ University of Cologne (email: ) · ² Yale University and New Economic School (email: ) · ³ Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole (email: )

Abstract

We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout and endogenous platforms. Parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to vote and discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We show that the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge in the political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead to the adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobilize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributive taxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voters who are demobilized.

DOI

10.1257/aer.20171927

Volume

112

Issue

2

Pages

689-719

Language

en

Sources

bibtex:phds-export.bib openalex crossref

Cite

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