American Economic Review Vol. 111 No. 8 2021
Targeting In-Kind Transfers through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation
Abstract
Public housing benefits are rationed through wait lists. Theoretical work on public housing allocation has debated how much choice applicants should have over units, identifying a possible trade-off between efficiency and redistribution. This paper empirically establishes the existence and economic importance of this trade-off using wait list data from Cambridge, Massachusetts. I estimate a model of public housing preferences in a setting where heterogeneous apartments are rationed through waiting time. Eliminating choice would improve targeting but reduce tenant welfare by more than 30 percent. Such a change is only justified on targeting grounds by a strong social preference for redistribution.
- DOI
- 10.1257/aer.20190516
- Volume
- 111
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 2660-2696
- Language
- en
- Sources
- openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref