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American Economic Review Vol. 111 No. 10 2021

Oligopolistic Price Leadership and Mergers: The United States Beer Industry

Nathan Miller1; Gloria Sheu2; Matthew C. Weinberg3

1 McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University (email: ) · 2 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (email: ) · 3 Ohio State University (email: )

Abstract

We study a repeated game of price leadership in which a firm proposes supermarkups over Bertrand prices to a coalition of rivals. Supermarkups and marginal costs are recoverable from data on prices and quantities using the model’s structure. In an application to the beer industry, we find that price leadership increases profit relative to Bertrand competition by 17 percent in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, and by 22 percent in 2010 and 2011, with the change mostly due to consolidation. We simulate two mergers, which relax binding incentive compatibility constraints and increase supermarkups. These coordinated effects arise even with efficiencies that offset price increases under Bertrand competition.

DOI
10.1257/aer.20190913
Volume
111
Issue
10
Pages
3123-3159
Language
en
Sources
openalex bibtex:phds-export.bib crossref

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